Bernhard Klingen
Abteilung Volkswirtschaftslehre
Universität Mannheim

Mit einer Mehrebenenanalyse wurden die Präferenzen von EU-Bürgern hinsichtlich der Kompetenzverteilung in der europäischen Sicherheitspolitik untersucht. Im Zentrum standen die konkurrierenden Hypothesen, dass die öffentliche Unterstützung für eine EU- bzw. NATO-Zuständigkeit auf eine Nachfrage nach Sicherheit zurückzuführen ist (Riker-Hypothese) oder dass sie maßgeblich von ideologischen Faktoren (Europhilie, Antiamerikanismus etc.) getragen wird. Als Datengrundlage dienten insbesondere die Umfrageergebnisse der Eurobarometer-Studien EB 62.0 und EB 66.1.

• Klingen, Bernhard; "Is Riker Right? -- Explaining Preferences for Common Defence"; SSRN-Working, 12. August 2009; online.
• Klingen, Bernhard; "A Public Choice Perspective on Defense and Alliance Policy"; in Coyne, Christopher J./Mathers, Rachel L. [Hrsg.], The Handbook on the Political Economy of War; Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press; 2011; Kap. 17, S. 335-55.
• Klingen, Bernhard; Die Politische Ökonomie der Verteidigungs- und Bündnispolitik; Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag; 2011.

Area: Politische Ökonomie

Software:

• Stata

Dirk Junge
MZES
Universität Mannheim

A central objective of political research is to obtain a general understanding of how legislative negotiations work and what factors shape their outcomes. Among the most influential analytical frameworks for the study of legislative negotiations count the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model and its extensions. These models allow insights into the determinants of democratic policies, the mechanisms of legislative negotiations and the impact of institutional design on its outcomes based on the general idea from game theory to perceive bargaining as alternating offer games . However, despite their importance for the theoretical understanding of legislative negotiations , empirical studies often lack the statistical models to appropriately test their predictive power.

The goal of this project is a) to develop statistical models that can help to obtain more accurate insights on the explanatory power of legislative bargaining theories based on quantal response analysis and b) to evaluate the explanatory power of the theories based on detailed data on lawmaking in the European Union. The statistical estimation of the models is computationally demanding due to the complexity of the model, the structure of the data negotiations and the estimation technique that involves advanced sampling methods. The research allows new insights on the explanatory power of the most important analystical framework for the study of legislative negotiations and provides practical evidence on how policies in the European Union are negotiated and how specific actors and aspects of the institutional design of the European Union affect the nature of laws produced by the European Union.

• Dirk Junge; "Game Theoretic Models and the Empirical Analysis of EU Policy Making: Strategic Interaction, Collective Decisions, and Statistical Inference." In Thomas König, George Tsebelis and Marc Debus (Eds): "Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision Making in Modern Democracies"; Springer: New York, Heidelberg, London; 2010.

Area: Political Science